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Introduction
2 The hung Parliament which resulted from the June 2017 general election is a further
instalment  in  a  decade-long  period  of  instability  in  British  politics.  It  followed  the
indecisive  2010  general  election,  the  2014  Scottish  referendum,  the  unexpected 2015
general election result, and the surprise 2016 referendum on the EU. The irony is that the
election was not supposed to happen until May 2020, in accordance with the Fixed Term
Parliament Act (FTPA). The unexpected election delivered many surprises1.
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3 Yet the 2015 Parliament had already been one of surprises. It did not last the scheduled
five years but less than two; Britain unexpectedly voted in a referendum to leave the
European Union; the Prime Minister David Cameron resigned after a year in office; and a
year later his successor Theresa May called an early general election in search of a bigger
majority  of  seats  which,  according to  the  opinion polls,  was  assured.  But  instead of
delivering a strong and stable government she lost her majority in the Commons, ended
up heading a minority government,  and a weakened Prime Minister and government
embarked on the most important and complex negotiations the UK had entered in living
memory. 
4 Another  surprise  is  that  the  return to  two party  politics  failed to  deliver  one party
majority government, the traditional defence of the first past the post system. However,
just one (2015) of the last three general elections has produced a majority for a single
party and that was one of only 12 seats and a short-lived Parliament.
5 The 2017 election was framed by the result of the referendum on Britain’s continued
membership of the EU which had been held a year earlier. Many of the electoral divisions
revealed  in  the  election,  particularly  of  age,  education  and  values,  had  been
foreshadowed in the referendum. But to what extent was it a Brexit election?
 
Referendum
6 David Cameron had promised a  referendum the Conservative manifesto for  the 2015
general election. He had been pressured to concede one by his MPs and the electoral
threat of Ukip. Ukip had campaigned for a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU
largely as a device to achieve Britain’s departure and was attracting support from the
Conservative voters and MPs. Given that all  the main parties favoured membership a
referendum was the only way to put it on the agenda. Cameron’s decision was largely to
do  with  internal  party  management.  The  Liberal  Democrats,  nationalist  parties  in
Scotland  and  Wales  and  most  of  the  Labour  party  were  opposed  both  to  holding  a
referendum and to withdrawal. 
7 Having won the general election Cameron decided to call a referendum for June 2016,
following his attempt to renegotiate the terms of Britain’s membership. He could point to
some concessions but he had gained little on the crucial issue of free movement; the
Leave campaign’s key theme of “Take Back Control” was about sovereignty but essentially
about cutting immigration. Cameron had been confident of winning the vote to remain -
he had won previous referendums on electoral  reform in 2011 and independence for
Scotland in 2014 – and most final opinion polls suggested his confidence would not be
misplaced. 
8 In the event the Leave side won by 52 to 48%, a narrow but decisive margin, and Cameron
resigned. He was succeeded by Theresa May who soon made it clear that she interpreted
the  vote  as  an  instruction  to  leave  the  customs  union,  the  single  market  and  the
jurisdiction of the ECJ. She would deliver Brexit - Britain’s departure from the EU. But at
that time she had no thoughts of calling an election before 2020. 
9 The  referendum  had  revealed  divisions  among  voters,  some  of  which  cut  across
traditional party votes and political values. Perhaps that was no surprise because it had
not been fought on party lines. A NatCen survey, for example, found that social liberals
and  social  traditionalists  had  different  attitudes  towards  the  EU:  66  per  cent  of
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traditionalists voted to leave, while 18 per cent of liberals did so. Rather than social class
the key demographic divides between the two sides were age and education, with the
older and the less -educated more likely to vote for leave and the young and those with
higher  education  qualifications  to  vote  for  remain.  The  result  also  revealed  sharp
geographic divisions. England and Wales voted to leave, with the prosperous London and
south-east of England backing remain, the north backing leave. Northern Ireland and
Scotland clearly voted to remain, with no voting area in Scotland backing leave. Britain
was evenly divided, as evident in the narrow majority in the vote
10 The result was a challenge for the two main parties. Two thirds of Labour voters voted
remain but according to Chris Hanretty some 70% of Labour seats voted leave2.  Many
Labour voters in coastal areas, the North and the Midlands were leavers; because they
were often elderly and/or lacked educational qualifications they were called the “left-
behinds”.  Yet  other  Labour  voters,  often  middle  class  and  university  graduates,  in
university towns, London (the only region in England to vote remain) and major cities
were Remainers; they were also more socially liberal, pro-immigration and cosmopolitan
in contrast to many of their party’s leave voters. 
11 Brexit laid bare the tensions in Labour’s electoral coalition and any leader would have
problems keeping it intact. In contrast to most of his MPs and party membership the
leader Jeremy Corbyn was a Eurosceptic. During the referendum he told an interviewer
that he rated his approval of the EU between “seven and seven and a half out of ten”; a
member of his core team suggested this was over-generous and it was more like five out
of ten at best.  And on a smaller but not insignificant scale the Conservatives faced a
similar  dilemma  with  a  slim  remain  majority  of  MPs  but  a  clear  leave  majority  of
Conservative members and voters and remainers in its seats in London and the south
east. Much of the analysis at the time 
 
The election
12 Starting in early 2017 senior colleagues were making the case to May to hold an early
election. David Davis, the Brexit minister, warned that the scheduled election date, 2020,
would run perilously close to the conclusion of the negotiations for Britain’s withdrawal
from the EU. Other ministers and advisers pointed to the narrowness of the government’s
majority  (12)  which  would  make  passing  complex  legislation  difficult,  the  lack  of  a
personal  mandate  for  May,  the  party’s  clear  lead in the  opinion polls,  and Labour’s
internal divisions. The case was persuasive. But having served less than a year as PM and
with three years of the Parliament to run May needed a compelling reason to dissolve
Parliament. Her campaign advisers Lynton Crosby and Mark Textor argued that because
voters were uncertain following the referendum, she should call for a mandate to get the
best Brexit deal for Britain and end uncertainty. And, given her high personal ratings and
massive lead over Corbyn, it should be a highly Presidential campaign built around her
rather than the Conservative party3. The Crosby Textor plan for a Brexit election meant
ditching a campaign which May’s Number 10 had been working on. They wanted her to
run as a “change” candidate offering radical social and economic reforms to help the
“just about managing”. She and they had interpreted the referendum vote as a protest
against a system that seemed to be working in favour of the well off and against those
struggling to make ends meet. On the steps of Downing Street when she had just been
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appointed Prime Minister she had spoken of her determination to tackle what she called
“burning injustices” in modern Britain. 
13 Following its  election defeat  in 2015 Labour had reacted in an unexpected way.  The
election as leader of Jeremy Corbyn meant that the party ended up with its most left -
wing leader in the post war period, an outsider who had struggled to get on the ballot and
was ranked as a 200-1 outsider in the contest to elect Ed Miliband’s successor. In the
opinion polls he and his party trailed May and the Conservative by large margins. He
struggled to form a shadow cabinet, was opposed by most of his MPs, who at one voted
overwhelmingly  for  him  to  resign,  and  was  widely  expected  to  lead  Labour  to  a
catastrophic election defeat. Labour was more divided than the Conservatives over Brexit,
probably another reason why the latter wanted such an election. 
 
A Brexit election?
14 After  the  election  some  commentators  seized  on  the  headline  to  a  British  Election
Survey’s report that it was “A Brexit Election”. According to the BES when the voters
were asked about the single most important issue facing the country at the time more
than third mentioned Brexit (compared to less than 10% mentioning the NHS and 5% the
economy). It also reported that before the campaign began the Conservatives had already
captured a good number of non-Conservative Leave voters, often from Ukip, and Labour
had lost many of its Leave voters; it therefore called it a Brexit election4. An Ashcroft
election day poll of 14, 000 voters (“How did this election result happen?”) found that
when asked unprompted questions about reasons for their vote Conservatives mentioned
Brexit (48%) and their confidence in May as the best to lead the negotiations. So far so
good for the claim that it was a Brexit election. 
15 Yet considering that May called the election ostensibly to give her a Brexit mandate it is
striking that the issue figures so little in the campaign and the broadcasters resolutely
refused Conservative pressure to cover it as a Brexit election5. It was always going to be
difficult anyway to frame the election as a Brexit one given that all parties agreed that
the referendum result meant that Britain was leaving the EU, although they differed on
what kind of Brexit should follow. Liberal Democrats held out the prospect of a second
referendum on the outcome of Brexit negotiations but it had little traction with voters.
More interesting would been the parties making proposals about what Brexit could lead
to and what kind of Britain they envisaged. There was much talk of a soft or a hard Brexit,
although  the  differences  probably  meant  little  to  most  voters.  But  there  was  little
clarification on such key issues as the numbers and types of immigrants who would be
allowed, trade-offs regarding the access to the single market, and role of the European
Court of Justice in areas of post-Brexit cooperation. Other matters such as the divorce
payment Britain would make to the EU, payments for continued access to the internal
market  and what  kind of  Irish  border  would  follow,  all  prominent  in  post  -election
discussions, were hardly touched on. As an educative forum on Brexit and the complex
issues it raised the 2017 general election was as bad as the 2016 referendum.
16 There was always a risk in proposing that the Conservatives campaign on Brexit because
May had little concrete to say - or was willing to say - about the trade-offs involved in her
plans. Having held her cards close to her chest before the election it was unclear how she
could stonewall over the course of a seven -week campaign. Did she have any plans or, if
Brexit, the Conservatives and the General Election 2017
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXIII-2 | 2018
4
she did, was she was fearful that revealing them might spark party and Cabinet divisions?
What kind of Brexit did she want that would be acceptable to the EU and keep her party
united? In the months following the election and the government had to make decisions
the party’s divisions between remainers and leavers were exposed. 
17 Corbyn was not much clearer. He had long been a Eurosceptic and had voted against
British entry in the first place, against Maastricht and had been lukewarm in his support
for the party’s remain campaign in the 2016 referendum. Given that the great majority of
his MPs and party membership (where his support rested) had backed Britain’s continued
membership and now favoured a “soft” Brexit he found it prudent to follow a line of
“constructive ambiguity”. His answer to questions about policy was that he was working
for a Brexit that protected jobs and prosperity, trying to avoid offending either side, and
not a view that May would disagree with. It was so effective that many Labour voters did
not know what the party’s policy was. He concentrated on domestic policies, particularly
the NHS, housing and education, issues on which the party led the Conservatives. For
reasons of internal party management both main party leaders had reasons for not going
strong on the issue. 
18 Corbyn’s calculation was probably correct.  The BES also found that for Labour voters
defending the NHS and public services against cuts greatly outweighed Brexit (mentioned
by only 8%) as the main reason they gave for their vote. Other and more nuanced analysis
in Ashcroft’s The Lost Majority found that while 29% (the highest figure) of voters regarded
negotiating Britain’s exit from the EU as the most important issue facing the country
when they were asked what mattered most to “me and my family” the issue fell to third
place behind the NHS and the cost of living. Ashcroft comments, “One reason for the Tory
miscalculation is  that Brexit  was just  not important enough to enough people”6.  The
findings may be part of an answer to his question: “If this was the Brexit election, what
went wrong?”7.
19 Some Conservatives regretted that the party failed to spell out how Brexit would improve
their everyday lives. The Prime Minister ‘s Number 10 political strategist and advocate of
the “change” agenda, Chris Wilkins later complained about the campaign’s focus on the
Brexit process, and May just saying “back me”:
20 This was a big negative. Months of research had shown us that talking about Brexit as a
process rather than an opportunity would turn people off. What people wanted was for us
to explain our policies through the prism of Brexit. In other words, when talking about
what you wanted to do with education for example, explain why it was important in the
context of Brexit and the kind of country we wanted to be as we emerged from Brexit.
21 Anti-Brexit Conservatives seized on Labour’s capture of a number of Conservative Remain
seats in England to make the case for a soft Brexit.  Labour’s stance was perhaps too
ambiguous, too dependent on who the party’s spokesperson was, to read much into its
stance. But given that the Conservatives were clearly the party for Leave, Labour was
probably the default option for Remainers.  Corbyn’s fence-sitting,  motivated more by
electoral concerns, paid off for the election.
22 In view of their Brexit pitch Conservatives might regret that some four million Leave
voters in the referendum did not vote in the election; for the most part they were 2015
Ukip and non-voters.  Its  campaign clearly failed to attract  many of those who were
outside the political  mainstream in 2015 but  had been energised a year later by the
referendum. On 8 June 14 million Remainers voted but only 13 million Leavers. In 2016
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the figures had been 16 million and 17 million respectively. Peter Kellner argues, on the
basis of the large (52,000) YouGov post -election survey, that that had they voted in the
same way as other pro-Brexit supporters the Conservatives would have gained an extra
30  seats8.  But  there  were  also  2015  Labour  Leave  voters  who remained with  Labour
because other domestic issues mattered to them9.
23 Contrary to much conventional wisdom campaigns clearly can matter – particularly if
one party does so badly that it allows the other to perform well. Starting some 20% ahead
in some polls the Conservatives were almost caught up by Labour on polling day. On
leadership,  Corbyn  narrowed  his  considerable  starting  deficit  against  May  on  the
question of being considered a capable Prime Minister. Labour also caught up with the
Conservatives  on  which  party  could  best  handle  major  issues.  YouGov  showed  it
overtaking the Conservatives on education and housing to add to its long - established
lead on the NHS and narrowing its deficit on managing the economy Voters gave higher
marks to Labour’s campaign on positivity, honesty, clarity and talking about the issues
they cared about. The British Election Study (BES) estimates that 19% of voters changed
their mind during the campaign. 
24 Normally switchers (mostly) cancel each other, as do late-deciders. But in 2017 Labour
won more than half of those who changed their minds during the campaign (compared to
just 19% who ended up with the Conservatives) and more than a quarter of those deciding
in the last few days10 In 2017 the changes in vote intentions had not cancelled out by
polling day as  Labour manged to recover many of  the voters  it  had lost  since 2015,
particularly among leave voters.
25 British elections are becoming more Presidential is so far as the personality of the leader
counts for more. It clearly counted in the election victories of Thatcher and Blair and for
Cameron over Brown in 2010 and over Miliband in 2015. There was mounting evidence
during the seven - week election campaign that May was hopelessly miscast as her party’s
central  message  bearer.  She  avoided  a  leaders’  TV  debate  with  Corbyn,  robotically
repeated her lines in interviews, and was filmed having meetings with supporting small
groups.  Meanwhile  Corbyn  was  filmed  nightly  address  packed  rallies  of  enthusiastic
supporters.  If  effective  campaigns  are  about  the  candidate  making  an  emotional
connection,  appearing  authentic  and  empathetic,  and  providing  good  photo
opportunities for cameras there was only one winner in 2017.
 
Result
26 The Conservative  campaign has  been widely  regarded as  a  failure  largely  because  it
surrendered its majority. In part the negative assessment has been driven by the high
expectations at the outset. Yet the party ended with 55 more seats than Labour, 43.5%
was its  highest  vote share since 1983 and at  each general  election since 1997 it  has
increased its share of the vote. It achieved its highest share in Wales in a century and
reversed a long period of decline in Scotland., ran ahead of Labour for first time since
1959. Its gains in the North and Scotland and among the working class made it more of a
national party, something Cameron’s modernisation project had aspired to. The increase
in its vote share of nearly 6% was reasonably expected to deliver a majority of seats for
the Conservatives. A similar vote share had gained Mrs Thatcher a landslide victory in
1983. What was not anticipated and upset the calculations was that Labour’s vote would
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increase from 2015 by as much as 9.8%, resulting in a 2% swing in its favour. As May
admitted after the election: “We didn’t see this coming” 
27 What emerges from survey and geographical analysis is the extent to which the votes of
the 2016 referendum cast a shadow over the election, loosening the party ties of both
former Conservative and Labour voters. A significant minority of voters shifted to align
their 2017 party vote with their 2016 referendum vote and in the process sharpened the
age and education differences between the parties. According to YouGov, 22% of Labour/
Leave voters who voted in 2017 switched to the Conservatives while 17% of Conservative/
Remain  voters  switched  to  Labour.  But  the  turnout  was  higher  (88%)  among  the
remainers than among the leavers (79%)11. The Conservatives may have underestimated
the softness of its remainer votes and as John Curtice cautioned: “In appealing to the
Brexiters, May seems to have forgotten that she needed to carry with her the half of the
country that voted remain”12. He might have added that a good number of them were
Conservatives, often young, well-educated and socially liberal, and who were prepared,
because of Brexit, to defect to Labour. 
28 Work by Jennings and Stoker places these social and political trends in a longer-term
perspective. They argue that the 2015 election, the referendum vote and the 2017 election
are the outcomes of a gradual bifurcation of English politics, between metropolitan and
cosmopolitan areas of economic growth whose inhabitants are comfortable with diversity
and are outward looking,  versus backwater areas,  often provincial  and coastal  parts,
whose inhabitants are uneasy about globalisation, technical progress, immigration and
Europe13. The latter have been called the left behinds but, given that a good number are
middle class, although often elderly, an alternative title might be the left outs.
29 The Conservatives ended with 313 seats, 13 down on 2015. Labour ended with 262, an
increase of 30, and gained 28 from the Conservatives. The Conservatives gained more
than half of the 2015 Ukip vote and increased their vote share in leave voting seats.
Labour retained many of its leave voting supporters but also did well in remain seats,
capturing a number of such Conservative seats14. The insurgent parties of 2015 suffered a
major reverse;  Ukip’s 12.9% of the 2015 vote shrunk to less than 2% (many Ukippers
decided not to vote or did not have a candidate to support) and in Scotland the SNP lost a
third of its vote and its MPs. 
30 The most striking finding of the election is that age has replaced social class as the main
divide between Labour and Conservative when it comes to elections, another referendum
echo.  As  the  over-55s  swung  to  the  Conservatives,  the  under-44  swung  to  Labour,
producing the biggest age gap since polling records were compiled. You Gov claimed that
47 was the age cut-off between the parties on 8th June. The cut-off had been 34 at the
start.
31 The relationship between social class and vote weakened further as Labour’s share of the
middle class and Conservative share of the working class reached their highest levels
since 1979 when Mrs Thatcher was first elected. Although the Conservatives had an 8%
lead among ABC1s,  Labour increased its  share among this  group by 12 %. And while
Labour led by 4% among C2DE voters the Conservatives increased their share by 12%.
Both parties are becoming more cross-class in their voting support. Long gone are the
days when it could be said that British politics was based on social class and that “all else
is embellishment and detail”.
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32 In  recent  elections  Britain  has  moved  to  a  multi-party  system,  with  Labour  and
Conservative  together  averaging  less  than  70%  of  the  vote.  In  2017,  however,  their
combined share rose to over 82% and 87.5% in England. The reassertion of two party
dominance is confined to England and Wales - in Scotland the SNP still has the most seats.
But the system has been restored with a difference. No longer are the parties’ support
buttressed by strong levels of class and partisan alignment, features which gave then a
dependable core support, election-after-election. What has emerged in 2017 is an ersatz 
form of two-party politics – with a more middle-class, socially liberal and younger Labour
and a  more working class  and more conservative  socially  and culturally  Tory party.
Support for both parties now rests on low levels of partisan identity – and one that could
well collapse just as easily as it seemed to arrive. The new, potentially uneasy, coalitions
were foreshadowed in the referendum and pose a challenge to the two main parties.
 
Conclusion
33 An election called to provide strong government and reduce uncertainly delivered the
opposite  on both counts.  How likely  is  it  that  May’s  government,  in  a  minority  and
dependent  on the DUP’s  ten MPs,  will  survive by -  election reverses,  defections and
rebellions  until  the  next  general  election,  scheduled  (according  to  the  Fixed  Term
Parliament  Act)  for  June 2022? In 1992 John Major’s  initial  majority  of  21 seats  had
disappeared by 1996. The hand to mouth existence of Labour minority governments in
1950,1974 and 1976-79 is hardly encouraging. Conditions which usually help sustain a
minority government include: the good - will it has if it is a first- time government; its
MPs believe that they owe their election to the leader’s popularity - a “coat-tails effect”;
the party is united on key issues; and the Prime Minister can credibly threaten opposition
parties with an election in which they are likely to lose ground. May’s government meets
none of these favourable conditions.
34 In the days  following the election a  jubilant  Labour team eagerly  looked forward to
another contest; momentum was with the party. But if the Conservatives need a swing of
0.5% to gain a majority of seats next time Labour15 needs one of nearly 5% to do so. And it
is unlikely to be a case of “one more heave”. Compared to the seats they won in 2017, the
seats they need to capture next time contain fewer voters who are young, graduates, and
black and ethnic minorities. Labour’s optimism needs to qualified. 
35 An unfortunate legacy of Brexit is how the issue has coarsened political debate. Remain
supporting MPs have been attacked as “Remoaners” and leave supporting newspapers
have attacked MPs hostile to Brexit as “saboteurs” and “traitors” and questioned the
integrity of sections of the civil service, judiciary, and Electoral Commission. In turn some
remainers  have  implied  that  leavers’  demands  for  cuts  to  immigration  has  a  racial
undertone and the Liberal Democrat leader Vince Cable has claimed that the leave vote
was largely by the elderly who were “driven by nostalgia” and longed for a world where
“faces were white”.
36 The European project (from the EC to the EU) has been a destabilising force in British
politics for nearly four decades. Labour’s call for withdrawal and a referendum split the
party  and  led  to  the  creation  of  the  SDP  in  1981.  Since  then  it  has  divided  the
Conservative party which has moved in a steadily Eurosceptic direction. Divisions over
the  issue  undermined  the  final  stages  of  the  premierships  of  Thatcher,  Major  and
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Cameron. Dissatisfaction with the EU fuelled the rise of Britain’s largest insurgent party,
Ukip, which gained 3.8 million votes in 2015 and forced the referendum. Even as Britain
negotiates its  divorce the potential  capacity for the European issue to cause strife is
unabated. 
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ABSTRACTS
Theresa May called a general election in 2017, hoping to increase her Parliamentary majority and
to  strengthen her  authority  in  negotiating  Britain’s  withdrawal  from  the  EU.  Although  her
Conservative party ended up as the largest party she lost her majority in the House of Commons.
The 2016 referendum, which voted for Britain to leave foreshadowed new patterns of political
alignment and these could be seen in the general election
Theresa  May déclencha  une  élection  en  2017  afin  d’augmenter  sa  majorité  parlementaire  et
renforcer son autorité pour mener à bien les négociations de sortie de l’UE du Royaume-Uni. Or,
bien que son parti  en soit ressorti  vainqueur,  elle perdit sa majorité.  Le référendum de 2016
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résultant  sur  le  processus  du  Brexit  préfigurait  de  nouveaux  alignements  politiques  qui
caractériseraient les élections législatives britanniques de 2017.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Brexit, élections législatives britanniques, Theresa May, référendum de juin 2016,
Jeremy Corbyn
Keywords: Brexit, Elections, Theresa May, EU Referendum, Jeremy Corbyn.
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